March 13-19 2025 | Issue 9 - CENTCOM and PACOM teams
Itamar Raizman, Giovanni Lamberti, Lucy Gibson, Amelia Bell, Nicholas Novak, Isabelle Hilyer-Jones, Sue Friend, Laura Fuchs, Sarah Nag, Jigyasa Maloo, Agathe Labadi, Miles Reever,
Sakura Morales, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor
In an effort to bring you the most actionable analytical information, we are combining regions in order to focus our efforts on a multitude of projects. The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) will continue to meet the challenges of the current threat environment as worldwide geopolitical shifts demand that we stay agile and flexible.
Kurdish Military[1]
Date: March 13, 2025
Location: Iraq and Syria
Parties involved: Turkey; Turkish Defense Ministry; Turkish forces; Syrian president Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa; Syria; Al-Sharaa administration; US-backed Kurdish-led coalition; Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); Kurdish militant group; Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK); PKK militants; Iraq; Iraqi government; Kurdish civilians in Syria; Kurdish civilians in Iraq; US
The event: The Turkish Defense Ministry announced that its forces killed 24 Kurdish militants in Northern Iraq and Syria despite the PKK’s request to disarm and the SDF’s recent deal with the current Syrian administration.[2]
Analysis & Implications:
Turkey’s continued military activity in Syria and Iraq will likely increase regional tensions and pressure on neighboring governments to clearly define their alignment with the Turkish operations and their stance on Kurdish groups. Turkey’s strikes in Syria and Iraq will likely serve as counterterrorism actions and assertive demonstrations of Turkish regional influence, very likely pressuring the Syrian administration to re-evaluate its position on Kurdish forces. This external pressure has a roughly even chance of prompting Iraq and Syria to reposition themselves in relation to the Kurdish groups and Turkish incursions, likely by altering military deployments near the contested zones or reconsidering diplomatic relations with Kurdish actors and Turkey. These dynamics will likely strain political normalization, multilateral counterterrorism coordination, and recent political arrangements related to Turkish aggression and the Kurdish case.
Turkey will likely continue targeting PKK militants despite the group’s discussion of disarmament, likely viewing these talks as a strategic effort to buy time and regroup rather than a genuine commitment to end hostilities. Turkish forces will very likely maintain their military outposts and counterterrorism operations in the Iraqi Qandil mountains, likely collaborating with the Iraqi government for intelligence and operational support. The PKK will likely try to negotiate a ceasefire by involving the SDF, al-Sharaa administration, and the US, likely prompting Turkey to intensify operations to weaken the PKK before any agreement is reached. Turkey’s strategy likely stems from Ankara’s view of these talks as a threat that could very likely legitimize PKK and restrict future military action.
The recent Turkish attacks will likely prompt Kurds living in Syria and Iraq to question the PKK’s talks of a ceasefire and SFD's deal with al-Sharaa, likely seeing these as a lack of commitment to the Kurdish cause. Kurdish civilians in Syria will very likely grow more concerned and doubtful about the deal between the SDF and al-Sharaa, likely remaining critical of the al-Sharaa administration and distrusting its political representatives. These feelings of instability and betrayal have a roughly even chance of enabling radicalization and motivating extremist individuals to conduct small-scale terrorist attacks against Turkish representatives and PKK members, as they will likely view violence as the only remaining means of resistance.
Date: March 16, 2025
Location: Balochistan, Pakistan
Parties involved: Government of Pakistan; Pakistani Armed Forces (PAF); Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI); Pakistani military troops; Pakistani civilians; Balochistan separatist militant group, Baloch Liberation Army (BLA); Baloch people; informants; China; Chinese economic initiatives, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) personnel; Afghanistan
The event: BLA has claimed a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) suicide attack targeting a Pakistani paramilitary convoy in Balochistan, killing five[3] and injuring over 30 troops.[4]
Analysis & Implications:
This attack very likely proved the significance of intelligence for the BLA, likely prompting the group to amplify its intelligence-gathering capabilities and operational effectiveness to continue conducting sophisticated attacks against the PAF. BLA will likely develop a robust intelligence network with informants from local communities along key transit routes such as Taftan along the Afghan border to know the frequency, peak hours, and vehicles traveling there. This intelligence advantage will very likely enable BLA to conduct more precise and impactful operations against high-value targets in the future, particularly in areas with key economic activities, such as the mineral industry in Balochistan. BLA will very likely increase the frequency of their activities and launch simultaneous attacks in multiple locations in Balochistan, very likely aiming to overwhelm the PAF and ISI’s operational capacity and push the Pakistani government to negotiate with BLA.
A surge in BLA attacks will likely disrupt natural resource extraction in Balochistan, likely reducing government revenues from key industries and contributing to economic instability by reducing foreign exchange earnings and fiscal capacity in Pakistan. BLA attacks will very likely exacerbate local grievances stemming from financial difficulties and resentment against insufficient government responses, likely increasing locals’ perceived legitimacy of BLA’s goals. BLA activity in Balochistan will likely deter both domestic and foreign investment in Balochistan’s resource sector, with the presence of armed groups and attacks in the area almost certainly making extraction operations costlier. This downturn in resource production will likely strain Pakistan’s ability to fund security operations and development projects in marginalized regions, likely causing increased poverty and limited government oversight influence in Balochistan.
Due to the success of this attack, BLA will very likely increase attacks on high-value, profitable infrastructure targets such as CPEC and BRI projects, likely causing China to reassess its Pakistani partnerships and BRI investments in strategic Balochistan locations like Gwadar. Beijing will likely demand the Pakistani government increase defense spending for security around Chinese projects in high-risk locations, very likely enhancing those CPEC projects’ attractiveness as BLA targets, based on their significance to Pakistan’s economy. BLA will likely conduct their attacks on these high-value target locations despite the increased security, very likely raising Chinese/Pakistani diplomatic and business tensions and straining CPEC and other BRI assets’ operability. Sustained attacks have a roughly even chance of prompting China to search for alternative infrastructure projects outside of Pakistan, likely damaging Pakistan’s economic and regional standing.
Date: March 20, 2025
Location: Indonesia
Parties involved: President of Indonesia, Subianto Prabowo; Prawobo’s cabinet; Indonesia; Indonesian government; opposition party, Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P); Indonesian National Armed Forces, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI); Indonesian Attorney General’s Office; Indonesian Supreme Court; Indonesian opposition leaders and elites; Indonesian military institutions; Indonesian civil society and human rights organizations; pro-democracy activists; protesters; China; India
The event: The Indonesian government amended the 2004 Law on the Indonesian Armed Forces, allowing soldiers to assume expanded domestic roles beyond defense, including working for the Attorney General’s Office and the Supreme Court.[5]
Analysis & Implications:
The newly passed military law will very likely decrease transparency and lead to the government and the Indonesian military's abuse of power and impunity. The amendment will likely shift future civilian-military relations in the country, almost certainly formalizing and reinforcing the trend of people with a common military background with Prabowo in civilian roles in his cabinet. By creating a loyal base within key government positions, Prabowo likely seeks to prevent internal dissent and coalition fragmentation, likely by marginalizing political elites who may challenge his policy decisions. The militarization of civilian affairs will likely weaken civilian officials' decision-making power, likely allowing military institutions to elude oversight and operate without accountability.
The Indonesian civil societies, human rights organizations, and pro-democracy activists will very likely organize protests to overturn the implementation of the new military law and expose the new law’s risks to increase awareness. They will very likely encourage discourse online and in the media regarding the government’s actions, very likely drawing attention to Prabowo’s past human rights violations such as the abduction and torture of activists. There is a roughly even chance that the increased power of the government and the military will worry protesters, likely causing some self-censorship among activists. The perceived increased risks of opposing the government and military in public will likely strengthen underground insurgency movements and polarization.
The military law will very likely grant national political stability and reduce the possibility of external political influence, likely enabling Indonesia to maintain its strategic autonomy while balancing its alliances with India and China. Assigning military personnel, who underwent an oath of enlistment, to governmental civil positions likely reduces the risk of insider threats from foreign regional powers interested in infiltrating the Indonesian government, such as China and India. External powers will very likely try to influence the political scene financing the PDI-P and heightening tensions in the political discourse, with a roughly even chance of causing political-related discrimination, in the form of treason accusations.
[1] Kurdistan, generated by a third party database
[2] Turkey says forces killed 24 Kurdish militants in Syria, Iraq in a week, Reuters, March 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-says-forces-killed-24-kurdish-militants-syria-iraq-week-2025-03-13/
[3] BLA claims 90 Pakistani soldiers killed in attack on army convoy in Balochistan, Times of India, March 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pakistani-troops-killed-injured-in-attack-on-army-convoy-balochistan-quetta-taftan-noshki-baloch-liberation-army/articleshow/119071490.cms
[4] Separatist suicide attack in southwestern Pakistan kills at least five, Reuters, March 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/separatist-suicide-attack-southwestern-pakistan-kills-least-five-2025-03-16/
[5] Why Indonesia’s new military law is alarming pro-democracy activists and rights groups, AP, March 2025,https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-parliament-new-military-law-99950f862d738e07cdb1586ccb08adbe