Victoire Tissinié, Giulia Filomia, Elena Alice Rossetti, Olympics Task Force Team
Anya Golend-Pratt, Editor; Jennifer Loy, Chief Editor
Date July 12, 2024
Paris 2024[1]
Summary
The important media coverage and numerous security concerns surrounding the 2024 Paris Olympic Games led to the deployment of various security units and resources. The opening ceremony, set to take place on July 26, is the target of numerous threats because of its large-scale and open-air nature. Departing from the Austerlitz bridge and ending at the Iéna bridge before its finale at the Trocadero,[2] the 6 kilometer-long parade will include nearly 100 boats and 10,000 participants.[3] Its size, global visibility, and vulnerability make it challenging for French authorities to ensure the highest level of protection from the diverse threats posed to the event. The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) previously analyzed, in Part 1 of the Threat Assessment on the opening ceremony, the potential for airborne attacks to target the opening ceremony. This second part instead assesses potential incidents on the ground, as the crowds attracted and the length of the parade also make this event vulnerable to terrestrial threats. The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) previously analyzed, in Part 1 of the Threat Assessment on the opening ceremony, the potential for airborne attacks to target the opening ceremony.[4] This second part instead assesses potential incidents on the ground, as the crowds attracted and the length of the parade also make this event vulnerable to terrestrial threats. The range of challenges to civilians’ physical safety will force security forces to adopt holistic protective measures to prevent and counter all types of threats.
Based on the quantity, validity and data verification, CTG assesses with HIGH CONFIDENCE that violent extremist groups will very likely attempt to conduct low-sophistication attacks with cold weapons such as knives, or home-made improvised explosive devices (IED), very likely benefitting from the event’s media coverage and the density of large crowds. Other threats to physical security, such as balconies falling off due to the weight of spectators along the Seine river or protests, will likely divert security forces’ attention and resources away from premeditated attacks, likely harming their capacity to respond in an efficient and coordinated manner. French authorities’ public communication of safety measures, risk-reduction efforts, and preparation ahead of the event will likely lessen the impacts of potential threats by reducing the chances of disruption and dissuading spectators from taking unnecessary risks. Combined efforts and lessons learned from past large-scale events will likely help local authorities to better coordinate the monitoring and mitigation of threats, likely improving their early detection.
Recent Events
French authorities have publicly shared a list of preventive security measures for the opening ceremony. They ran over 250,000 background checks for all people linked to the Olympics, including volunteers.[5] Security forces established a highly protected zone, comprising the first row of buildings along the Seine, acting as an anti-terrorism perimeter.[6] To regulate the traffic, they defined colored areas with digital passes granting limited motorized access.[7] According to the government, more than 100,000 ticket holders will view the parade from lower embankments, while the remaining spectators will be on higher embankments, with a total of around 326,000 tickets sold in total.[8] Based on safety concerns, Olympic executives made the attendance policy stricter by revoking tourists’ free access to the opening ceremony, initially expected to host close to 600,000 spectators.[9]
Assessments
Terrorist and extremist groups will very likely try to exploit the concentration of the 326,000 spectators[10] in the upper and lower banks of the Seine to conduct low-sophistication attacks using cold weapons or home-made improvised explosives devices (IEDs), as in the 2013 Boston Marathon. The widespread presence of security checks, law enforcement, and access control will very likely discourage complex, organized attacks, leading perpetrators, such as lone actors, to choose cold weapons and limit the scope of their assaults. The concentration of spectators will likely multiply the consequences of any physical attack, regardless of the number of injuries or deaths. Stabbing, bomb threats, or the presence of suspicious unattended objects will very likely spread panic, likely prompting nearby attendees to vacate the area immediately. Without proper evacuation plans and effective, clear communication from Olympic organizers, threats and attacks will very likely trigger disorderly reactions, with a roughly even chance of stampede risks.
The opening ceremony will likely be the primary target of terrorist and extremist groups seeking to gain media coverage, exploit crowds gathering in the ceremony venues, and multiply the destructive effects of attacks. Considering the open-source French security apparatus' details, such as the extensive background checks,[11] increased surveillance, and the planned security perimeters,[12] potential attackers will very likely avoid entering the Seine banks, likely focusing on nearby targets, such as transport stations, entertainment areas, and check-points. Perpetrators will unlikely use vehicles to ram a crowd, considering the traffic restriction, but pedestrian and bicycle access will likely enable attackers to reach these areas and place homemade weapons. There is a roughly even chance that perpetrators will select target venues not based on their vicinity but on their ties with the event. Established fan zones and side-events in different Paris districts and the whole Ile-de-France region, such as the Paris fête les Jeux, will very likely attract many visitors,[13] while presenting fewer security measures. There is a roughly even chance that terrorists will choose to attack locations that are not directly linked to the opening ceremony, based on easy access and high density of targets, such as commuting areas or restaurants outside of the security perimeter, that will very likely be overcrowded in the hours before the start of the Olympic ceremony and after its end.
Bridges located outside security perimeters will very likely become vulnerable spots for possible terrorist attacks, including vehicle ramming. Considering the lack of security traffic measures in those areas, vehicle ramming attacks will very likely kill many individuals at once, likely causing terror and panic among the crowds. Crowd congestion on the bridges will very likely make it difficult for people to escape, very likely increasing the number of injured and dead. The bridges’ structure and the presence of large crowds will very likely hinder the emergency services' ability to assist the victims, almost certainly increasing the impact of the attack.
Common crimes, especially pickpocketing and drug trafficking, will likely increase the risks for the opening ceremony visitors. Paris authorities tried to crack down on criminal activities in the venues' area, but Paris prosecutor Laure Beccuau predicted a rise in “pick-pocketing, housing scams and other crimes” against tourists.[14] There is a roughly even chance that ticket scams[15] and other fraudulent actions will spread fake tickets, likely delaying check-ins and disrupting the planned access flows. Increased pedestrian traffic and tourists’ limited knowledge of the area will likely ease criminals’ ability to target passersby, profiting from overcrowded places and tourist attention to landmarks, Olympic areas, and service information. Since restricted access areas request visitors to show a Pass Jeux (digital pass QR code),[16] opportunistic crimes will likely increase in the opening ceremony entrances, with thieves having a roughly even chance of exploiting visitors’ opening bags or wallets to show tickets, identification cards, and remove liquids for inspection.
Other threats to visitors’ physical security will likely divert security forces’ attention and resources away from pre-meditated attacks, likely hindering their capacity to prevent or counter them in an efficient and timely manner. As spectators will likely gather in large numbers in the apartments of the first-row buildings bordering the Seine, there is a roughly even chance that incidents, such as balconies collapsing due to the weight limit being exceeded, will occur. The need to monitor and reduce the risks of structural failures or accidents in the residential blocs overlooking the parade will very likely require security forces on the grounds to prioritize certain areas of concern. They will likely be forced to allocate resources and task a part of their personnel with setting up barriers and warning signs, and monitoring the structural integrity of buildings. The split of their focus and assets will likely reduce the number of officers available for crowd control in other parts of the event area, likely impeding their availability to respond to other, higher-impact incidents.
Voluntary disruptions of the event’s organization, such as protests or planned sabotage, will likely require French authorities to deploy additional personnel, likely straining security forces’ resources and delaying or hampering their ability to respond to terrorist threats and other crimes. Activist groups will likely try to organize large-scale protests advocating for political, environmental, or social issues linked to current domestic and global geopolitical events, such as the French elections, or the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. Fake volunteers will likely sign up to participate in the organization of the opening ceremony with the intent to disrupt operations from within. Plans of sabotage will likely include logistical issues and the disruption of communications, likely complicating security forces’ ability to ensure effective crowd control. Incidents within the crowd and officers’ hindered capacity to contain movements, likely increasing the risk of stampedes. Demonstrations will likely involve the use of violence and acts of vandalism, likely requiring enhanced vigilance and swift responses from security forces, very likely preventing them from fully focusing their efforts and attention on terrorism and crimes.
Transportation will likely present multiple challenges for visitors, likely remaining a critical element for the security of the opening ceremony. Potential strikes of transport-sector workers will likely threaten the orderly flow of tourists and visitors, likely increasing uncertainty both for organizers and security personnel.[17] Planned station closures, with many restrictions becoming effective only from July 26,[18] will very likely increase complexity for newly-arrived tourists, unless Olympics organizers and French authorities implement clear, up-to-date communication in multiple languages. The specific timing of the opening ceremony almost certainly requires visitors to arrive at venues simultaneously, very likely prompting a sudden increase in passengers. Considering the vehicle restrictions, public transport will almost certainly see a surge in the area, likey making end-stations near the opening ceremony overcrowded. This increased people density and potential uncertainty in finding the right path to the venues will likely enlarge visitors' vulnerability to common crimes or knife attacks, both related to gangs or terrorists.
Considering the authorities’ background checks for spectators and the Olympic spirit, a large presence of extremist hooligans is unlikely, but a roughly even chance of clashes between supporters remains, as happened during the EURO 2024 soccer tournament.[19] The allocation of tickets to inhabitants of nearby municipalities has a roughly even chance of leading to the proximity of opposite football supporters, likely increasing the threat of violent confrontation, as occurred after the Olympique de Marseille vs Olympique Lyonnais match.[20] Should extremist or controversial slogans and gestures appear,[21] they will likely spark verbal or physical attacks. Ongoing international crises, such as the Israel/Hamas conflict and historical grievances, such as the ones linked to Balkan wars, will likely influence spectators’ sensibility and actions, with a roughly even chance of little extremist groups spreading provocative stances among the public. Voiced protest against Israel's participation, antisemitic comments, or racist stances will have a roughly even chance to disrupt the peaceful and joyful spirit of the games, likely increasing the risks of verbal confrontations among spectators. Anti-Olympics groups, such as far-left and extremist environmentalist movements like Soulèvements de la Terre and Dernière Rénovation,[22] will likely try to infiltrate among volunteers and spectators to commit demonstrative actions and disrupt the planned opening ceremony flow.
As French authorities started preparing for the Opening Ceremony in advance, the consideration and anticipation of all threats posed to the physical security of visitors will likely reduce the chances of incidents occurring. The constant public communication on the threats linked to the event and ways to prevent them will likely dissuade visitors from taking unnecessary risks and encourage them to adopt the safety measures advised by authorities, such as not exceeding the weight limit on balconies. Background checks conducted prior to the parade will likely prove efficient in filtering out suspicious profiles, likely reducing the chances of terrorists or fake volunteers infiltrating the event. Repeated warnings from authorities and the media will likely increase visitors’ vigilance, likely keeping them on the lookout for potential threats and allowing them to adapt more quickly and calmly to unforeseen situations. The research on the variety of menaces targeting the event, the elaboration of adequate security perimeters, the use of foreign support, and the overall preparation months before the start of the event will likely facilitate security forces' work and coordination on the ground.
Future Implications
Terrorists and extremists will likely use online propaganda and past attacks as an inspirational and practical guide. ISIS and al-Qaeda propaganda online[23] inciting followers to hit sports events will likely provide potential perpetrators with motivational calls and step-by-step instructions on how to attack, likely easing their planning and home-made weapons production. Past terrorist actions such as the 2002 Bernabéu stadium, or the 2015 Stade de France attacks[24] will likely show potential consequences and vulnerabilities of nearby locations. Attackers targeting symbolic Olympics venues, likely with home-made explosives or knives, will almost certainly devise a plan B, aiming at inflicting damages and deaths even without reaching the primary target. The possibility to attack earlier or place the explosive devices outside of the most surveilled perimeter will likely challenge law enforcement responsiveness. Implementing widespread security officials' presence to counter diversified threats has a roughly even chance of overstretching both armed forces and emergency services, likely hindering their immediate deployment where most needed. Failed or thwarted terrorist attacks will very likely require law enforcement intervention to cordon off the area and ensure they have neutralized any potential threats, likely creating chaos and panic among the crowd.
Ensuring orderly access and crowd management will almost certainly play a key role in securing the ceremony. Authorities and organizers will very likely focus on checking entrances and perimeters, with a roughly even chance that extensive controls will create bottle-necks. The arrival and departure of spectators and attendees will very likely represent a critical time for security personnel, likely requiring enhanced coordination with different police and military units on the ground. Public officers and private security teams working in the Olympics venues and the Ile-de-France area will very likely need to foster comprehensive surveillance, information sharing, and flexibility, should disruptions or attack attempts occur. Organizers and authorities will very likely aim to inform the public regarding road and transport closure through official websites and Paris 2024 App,[25] likely reducing delays and overcrowding.
Lessons learned from international, big sports events and the guidelines of the Saint-Denis Convention[26] will very likely help authorities assess and mitigate risks, very likely promoting a multifaceted approach. French security authorities will very likely need to continuously monitor opening ceremony threats to update and re-align security plans, likely issuing precise alerts. Communicating to deployed officials the risks covering terrorist activities, common crime, protests, clashes, and security alerts will almost certainly enhance the security apparatus’ ability to prevent attacks and mitigate threats. Understanding foreign military forces’ main assets and ensuring common protocols will very likely limit the risks of overlapping while securing comprehensive surveillance, likely leading Paris authorities to position forces based on their core-competencies. Coordination among security officials and Olympics organizers, and spectators’ cooperation will likely enhance early detection of potential threats and disruptions.
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[1] Olympics Paris, generated by a third party database
[2] The Opening Ceremony, Olympics, n.d., https://olympics.com/en/paris-2024/the-games/ceremonies/opening-ceremony
[3] More details about the opening ceremony: the start time has been announced, Infobae, March 2024, https://www.infobae.com/aroundtherings/articles/2024/03/10/more-details-about-the-opening-ceremony-the-start-time-has-been-announced/
[4] THREAT ASSESSMENT OLYMPICS OPENING CEREMONY PART 1: AIRBORNE ATTACKS VERY LIKELY; STRENGHTENING OF THE SECURITY APPARATUS AND DRONE-SHIELD SYSTEMS NEEDED, by Olympics Task Force Team.
[5] Protecting Major Sporting Events from Terrorism: Considerations for the Paris Olympics and Beyond, Combating Terrorism Center, June 2024, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/protecting-major-sporting-events-from-terrorism-considerations-for-the-paris-olympics-and-beyond/
[6] Ibid
[7] A survival guide to Paris transport closures for the 2024 Olympics, France 24, July 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/sport/20240706-survival-guide-paris-transport-info-closures-2024-olympics
[8] Olympics Opening Ceremony Closed to Tourists Amid Security Concerns, Voice of America, March 2024, https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.voanews.com/amp/olympics-opening-ceremony-closed-to-tourists-amid-security-concerns/7515053.html
[9] Ibid
[10] Ibid
[11] Massive policing for Paris Olympics to include security checks for some of the capital’s residents, AP, April 2024, https://apnews.com/article/paris-olympics-france-ceremony-security-7a403518f672f2422e4ad55a2b435186
[12] The opening ceremony of the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, Ministère des Transports, 2024, https://anticiperlesjeux.gouv.fr/en/I%27m-informing-myself/opening-ceremony-olympic-games-paris-2024
[13] La carte des festivités, La Ville de Paris, 2024, https://www.paris.fr/jeux-2024 (Translated by Google)
[14] French police arrest 15 for drug trafficking near Olympic village, Le Monde, May 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2024/05/29/paris-2024-french-police-arrest-15-for-drug-trafficking-near-olympic-village_6673007_7.html#
[15] FREE TICKET SCAM FOR THE OPENING CEREMONY OF THE GAMES, Paris 2024, May 2024, https://olympics.com/en/news/free-ticket-scam-for-the-opening-ceremony-of-the-paris-2024-paralympic-games
[16] Welcome to the official Pass Jeux website, Préfecture de Police, 2024, https://www.pass-jeux.gouv.fr/en/
[17] Paris rail workers strike over Olympics bonuses with Games just two months away, France 24, May 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240521-strike-over-olympics-bonuses-disrupts-paris-trains
[18] The opening ceremony of the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, Ministère des Transports, 2024, https://anticiperlesjeux.gouv.fr/en/I%27m-informing-myself/opening-ceremony-olympic-games-paris-2024
[19] German police intervene to stem clashes between England and Serbia fans before Euro 2024 match, AP, June 2024,
[20] French football sees more fan violence ahead of 2024 Olympics, France 24, October 2023, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20231030-french-football-sees-new-spiral-of-violence-ahead-of-2024-olympics
[21] Bitter Balkan feuds spill into Euros once again, Reuters, June 2024, https://www.reuters.com/sports/soccer/bitter-balkan-feuds-spill-into-euros-once-again-2024-06-25/
[22] Paris 2024: The anti-Olympic movement struggles to rally, Le Monde, April 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2024/04/09/paris-2024-the-anti-olympic-movement-struggles-to-rally_6667914_7.html
[23] IMMINENT WARNING: ISIS-K THREAT AGAINST UEFA EURO 2024; HEIGHTENED SECURITY MEASURES AND INCREASING MONITORING NEEDED, by WATCH/GSOC Team
[24] “Protecting Major Sporting Events from Terrorism: Considerations for the Paris Olympics and Beyond,” CTC Sentinel, June 2024, ”https://ctc.westpoint.edu/protecting-major-sporting-events-from-terrorism-considerations-for-the-paris-olympics-and-beyond/
[25]DOWNLOAD THE OFFICIAL OLYMPICS PARIS 2024 APP, Paris 2024, https://olympics.com/en/paris-2024/download-olympics-mobile-app
[26] Safety, Security and Service: the Saint-Denis Convention, The Council of Europe, n.d., https://www.coe.int/en/web/sport/safety-security-and-service-approach-convention