September 19-25, 2024 | Issue 38 - PACOM and Weapons/Tactics
Samuel Pearson, Nicholas Novak, Zara Price, Agathe Labadi, Léonard Vacelet–Revolio, Martina Sclaverano
Naureen Salim, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor
Ballistic Missile Test[1]
Date: September 19, 2024
Location: Kaechon, South Pyongan Province, North Korea
Parties involved: North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong Un; North Korea; Korean People's Army (KPA); North Korean state media; South Korea; South Korean population; South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff; South Korean military; South Korean and US defense planners; US military; US allies; Australian, UK, and US Security partnership (AUKUS); Japan; Russia; Ukraine; Middle East
The event: North Korea test-fired the Hwasongpo-11-Da-4.5, a tactical ballistic missile capable of carrying a 4.5-ton "super-large" warhead.[2] North Korean state media announced the test aimed to verify the missile's accuracy over a 320-kilometer range. This test is part of North Korea’s broader efforts to bolster its military capabilities amidst perceived threats from the US and South Korea. South Korean experts questioned the missile’s true capabilities and called for verification.[3]
Analysis & Implications:
North Korea very likely tested the missile to show its improved arsenal and continued investment in missile technology, likely leading South Korea and regional US-allied countries to reassess and adapt their military strategies. North Korea’s test of a missile designed for a heavier warhead very likely signals its intent to match the growing military capabilities and strategies of South Korean-US alliance forces, like South Korea’s "Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation" (KMPR) plan which intends to destroy North Korean command and control (C2). While this military development will likely temporarily increase North Korea’s deterrence credibility, South Korea and the US will likely accelerate their missile defense and preemptive strike capabilities, which will likely exacerbate the arms race. North Korea and US allies will likely keep increasing their military postures to deter each other, very likely making de-escalation and negotiations difficult.
North Korea’s ability to deploy missiles capable of carrying large conventional or nuclear warheads will very likely create an ambiguity between conventional and nuclear threats, likely increasing neighboring countries' interest in new military cooperation initiatives, such as AUKUS. In an emergency scenario, US and South Korean defense planners will very likely face challenges in determining whether a North Korean missile launch is conventional or nuclear. This unpredictability almost certainly raises the stakes during potential conflict situations, as misreading a missile attack will very likely provoke an escalatory response. The uncertainty of North Korea’s nuclear posture will very likely induce neighboring countries, such as Japan and South Korea, to deepen military cooperation with the US and other powers present in the region, very likely increasing negotiations about AUKUS partnership and involvement.
This new test very likely encourages the growth of illicit global arms trade networks, where North Korea shares missile technology in exchange for economic and diplomatic support. These interactions will likely strengthen North Korea’s alliances with other isolated countries or actors, such as Russia, providing Pyongyang with funding and strategic partnerships. This flow of missile technology would very likely increase the risk of destabilizing regions, as missiles or other advanced weaponry could be transferred to conflict zones like Ukraine and the Middle East.
Date: September 23, 2024
Location: New Delhi, India
Parties involved: India; Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar; the Indian military; Indian population; anti-Indian rebels; Myanmar junta; Myanmar; anti-junta groups; ethnic armed group Chin National Front (CNF); ethnic armed group Arakan Army (AA); ethnic armed group Kachin Independence Army (KIA); Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); China;
The event: India invited the CNF, the AA, and the KIA leaders to a seminar on “Constitutionalism and Federalism” in New Delhi in November. This meeting marks India’s first diplomatic engagement with Myanmar’s non-state actors. In June 2024, Jaishankar expressed concern over border instability and threats to the Kaladan port and highway project, which India is building.[4] Media reporting from January 2024 indicates that anti-Indian rebel groups have established camps in Myanmar, and operate across the Indian-Myanmar border.[5]
Analysis & Implications:
India likely intends to use this meeting with anti-junta groups to foster dialogue between them and the military junta and secure the Kaladan port and the he Kaladan port Indian trilateral highway project. India will likely seek support from ASEAN members, such as Thailand or Vietnam to facilitate dialogue between the junta and rebel forces for a peace deal in the Rakhine and Chin states. The dialogue will likely seek to cordon an area around Indian infrastructure in these states to prevent disruptions or damage to the Kaladan port and highway project.
India will likely aim to build relationships with anti-junta forces to counter Indian rebel groups operating from North and Western Myanmar. Through unofficially seeking agreement with anti-junta groups India will likely hope to persuade these groups to disrupt Indian rebel operations and deny them refuge in Myanmar, by gathering intelligence in collaboration with the Indian military, detaining anti-India rebels, and confiscating their equipment. If this pursuit occurs it will very likely force anti-Indian rebels into hiding, reducing their activities to avoid capture. If successful, India’s strategy will likely reduce attacks in its territory, thereby denying these anti-India groups opportunities to propagandize, recruit, and build credibility, limiting these groups’ growth and effectiveness.
Unlock the Power of Knowledge with The Counter Threat Center! Elevate your threat detection capabilities with critical intelligence on global threats. Join us for a free trial and equip yourself to safeguard those you've sworn to protect. Click here to learn more: https://www.counterthreatcenter.com/subscriptions
[1] ARAV-B launch during Pacific Dragon 2024, by Pacific Missile Range Facility, licensed under Public Doman (The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.)
[2] North Korea’s new missile can carry ‘super-large’ warhead: state media, Radio Free Asia, September 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/north-korea-super-large-warhead-09192024015700.html
[3] Ibid.
[4] Exclusive: India extends unprecedented invite to Myanmar's anti-junta forces, sources say, Reuters, September 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-extends-unprecedented-invite-myanmars-anti-junta-forces-sources-say-2024-09-23/
[5] India-Myanmar: Why Delhi wants to fence the 'troubled' border, BBC, January 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-68078252