February 20-26, 2025 | Issue 6 - CENTCOM and PACOM teams
Amelia Bell, Nicholas Novak, Martina Sclaverano, Jigyasa Maloo, Itamar Raizman, Agathe Labadi
Naureen Salim, Angelina Sammarco, Editor; Elena Alice Rossetti, Senior Editor
Kyrgyz-Tajik Border[1]
Date: February 21, 2025
Location: Kyrgyz-Tajik border
Parties involved: Kyrgyzstan; Kyrgyz armed forces; Kyrgyz government; Kyrgyz civilians; Tajikistan; Tajik government; Tajik armed forces; ethnic Tajik groups; local authorities; civilians in border regions
The event: Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan resolved their decades-old border dispute regarding contested sections along their 970km border after past clashes killed over 100 people.[2]
Analysis & Implications:
The border agreement will very likely impact Vorukh, a Tajik enclave in Kyrgyzstan, either confirming its current borders or adjusting them for safer, more legitimate routes of transport to and from this enclave. Disputes over transport networks connecting Vorukh to Tajikistan will likely continue, likely driven by maintenance and logistics costs of the Isfana Road and border checkpoints. The new agreement will likely restrict travel to and from the enclave to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized individuals and unverified cargo crossing the borders.
Previously displaced Kyrgyz civilians will likely return to their homes in the Batken Region, likely expecting greater security and stability under the new border agreement. They will likely pressure local authorities to enforce stronger border control, increase military presence, and prevent unauthorized Tajik crossings. Ethnic Tajik groups in Batken will likely face increased isolation, likely prompting some to relocate to Tajik-majority villages along the border to avoid discrimination or land disputes. This internal migration will likely occur in the weeks following the presidents’ confirmation of the agreement.
Despite the agreement between both governments, local civilians will unlikely support the new borders, very likely leading to cross-border violence and clashes. Minority groups along the border will likely resist the agreement through violent attacks, likely escalating tensions, destabilizing the region, and limiting diplomatic efforts. The cross-border violence will likely require government intervention, likely straining diplomatic ties and complicating future negotiations between the two nations.
Date: February 23, 2025
Location: West Bank, Palestine
Parties involved: Israel; Israeli authorities; Israeli Defense Force (IDF); Palestinian nationalist Sunni Islamist political and military movement, Hamas; Palestine; Palestinian militant groups; Palestinian Military forces; Palestinian Islamist paramilitary organization, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ); Palestinian civilians; Muslim and Jewish communities; extremist groups
The event: Israel deployed tanks into the West Bank, Palestine, for the first time in over 20 years, ordering the military to prepare for an extended operation targeting Palestinian militant groups in refugee camps.[3]
Analysis & Implications:
Israel will very likely launch large-scale military operations in the West Bank, very likely coinciding with the beginning of Ramadan and very likely furthering regional tensions. Israeli strikes and attacks against Palestinian civilian camps will likely occur at strategic times, such as iftar or during the day when fasting Palestinians likely have lower energy to respond and counterattack. Tensions between Muslim and Jewish communities will likely lead extremist groups of both religions to commit attacks in Israeli and Palestinian cities, likely involving the disruption of prayer moments, vandalism, and physical confrontations. Israeli authorities will likely restrict access to Al-Aqsa mosque, likely leading to Muslim civilians’ rebellions.
The deployment of tanks will likely alter Israel’s military strategy in the West Bank in the coming weeks. The IDF will very likely avoid moving tanks into territories like the Golan Heights due to unsuitable terrain, which could increase the risk of militant groups’ attacks or damage, very likely shifting to more favorable areas allowing better control over the tanks' trajectory and speed. The IDF will very likely move the battleground to open spaces, where tanks would almost certainly provide a tactical advantage against the Palestinian militia’s smaller and less sophisticated weaponry. Islamist militant groups, such as Hamas, will very likely attempt to counter the tanks’ advance and damage Israel’s weaponry, likely setting up improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along the tanks’ path and ambushes where tanks are slower or have limited visibility.
The introduction of Israeli tanks in the West Bank will very likely worsen the existing humanitarian crisis, very likely reinforcing Palestinian grievances against Israel and solidifying a perpetual conflict. The use of heavy armor, like tanks, will very likely cause severe infrastructure damage, likely making refugee camps such as the ones bordering Tulkarm and Jenin in the West Bank uninhabitable in the immediate term and slowing reconstruction efforts in the long term. The growing humanitarian crisis will very likely drive more Palestinians to seek refuge in Jordan, likely straining regional stability and increasing international diplomatic tensions with Israel. The intensified destruction and displacement will very likely push more Palestinians toward radicalization, likely increasing recruitment into militant groups such as Hamas and PIJ.
Date: February 26, 2025
Location: China
Parties Involved: Chinese government; Chinese state media; Chinese social media platform Xiaohongshu; Chinese social media platform Douyin; Chinese citizens; Philippines; Filipino citizens; US
The event: Chinese state media has called for the Philippines to withdraw the US’ Typhon missile system from the South China Sea, accusing the Philippines of violating its promise to remove the system after initially deploying it temporarily.[4]
Analysis & Implications:
The Chinese state media statement will likely spread anti-Filipino sentiment among Chinese citizens, likely framing the missile deployment as an act of aggression. In the upcoming weeks, Chinese social media, such as Xiaohongshu and Douyin, will likely face an increase in online hate discourse against the Philippines. Social media platforms will unlikely remove aggressive messages, likely fostering support for the Chinese government’s policy in the South China Sea. Filipino citizens residing in China will likely face isolation, with a roughly even chance of discrimination in public spaces and in the workplace.
Given that these narratives originate from state media, they are very likely part of a broader Chinese government effort to portray the Philippines as the aggressor and China as the victim. Chinese state representatives will likely reinforce this framing in their upcoming speeches, very likely using the perceived Philippines’ aggression as a justification for increased defensive measures and drills. The government will likely amplify messaging on Chinese military technology and exercises, using parades and social media to showcase its capabilities to counter the Philippines' weaponry.
[1] Tajikistan by Google Earth
[2] Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan settle border dispute that sparked deadly clashes, Reuters, February 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/kyrgyzstan-tajikistan-settle-border-dispute-that-sparked-deadly-clashes-2025-02-21/
[3] Israel sends tanks into West Bank, tells troops to ready for 'extended' stay, Reuters, February 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-defence-minister-tells-military-prepare-extended-west-bank-stay-2025-02-23/
[4] Philippines should withdraw missile system from South China Sea, Chinese state media, Reuters, February 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-should-withdraw-missile-system-south-china-sea-chinese-state-media-2025-02-26/