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HUNGARY SUGGESTS FMD OUTBREAK AS A BIOLOGICAL ATTACK, SUDANESE RSF SEIZES CONTROL OF THE ZAMZAM CAMP IN NORTH DARFUR, AND RUSSIA CONVICTS FOUR JOURNALISTS OVER ALLEGED TIES WITH NAVALNY

April 10-16, 2025 | Issue 13 - AFRICOM and EUCOM

Jennifer Radlinsky, Leon Kille, Sophia Schultz, Alexandru Boldor, Camilla Raffaelli, Ludovica Leccese, Agathe Labadi, Miruna Moise

Naureen Salim, Editor; Radhika Ramalinga Venkatachalam, Senior Editor


In an effort to bring you the most actionable analytical information, we are combining regions in order to focus our efforts on a multitude of projects. The Counterterrorism Group (CTG) will continue to meet the challenges of the current threat environment as worldwide geopolitical shifts demand that we stay agile and flexible.  


Hungarian Cattle Farm[1]


Date: April 10, 2025

Location: Hungary

Parties involved: Hungary; Hungarian government; Prime Minister Viktor Orban's chief of staff Gergely Gulyas; Hungarian electorate; Hungarian emergency management response system; Hungarian government opposition; Hungarian cattle farmers; Hungarian media; EU; EU biosecurity agencies

The event: Gulyas stated that authorities could not rule out a biological attack as the cause of a recent outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) affecting cattle.[2]

Analysis & Implications:

  • There is a roughly even chance that the Hungarian government’s claim linking the FMD outbreak to a biological attack constitutes a disinformation campaign, likely letting the public create its own narratives to reduce direct accusations against the Hungarian government. The government will likely instrumentalize the public discourse as a deflection to redirect public attention from the looming risks and leverage time to improve containment efforts. The Hungarian government will very likely employ press releases and pro-government public service media platforms, such as state-owned television broadcasts, to generate and disseminate vague claims about foreign involvement to shape the public discourse on the outbreak's origins, likely justifying controversial policies such as the burial of animal carcasses near inhabited settlements. There is a roughly even chance that the Hungarian government will omit and obscure data concerning the outbreak's severity, likely hoping to overshadow its containment struggles and to satisfy the Hungarian electorate, particularly cattle farmers, by downplaying the actual risks to Hungary’s agricultural sector.

  • The Hungarian government's suggestion of FMD as a biological attack will likely enable unwelcome operational restrictions against farmers, such as property inspections by security personnel seeking evidence of deliberate contamination. There is a roughly even chance that this narrative will allow the government to introduce unpopular legal measures, such as expensive cattle herd health monitoring systems that exceed standard disease containment protocols. The government will likely portray opposition to implementing restrictions as unpatriotic, very likely reducing space for scientific and public health discussions. Authorities will almost certainly rely on media platforms to shape public perception and limit opposition coverage of restrictions, likely leading to political and social upheavals until the 2026 parliamentary elections, such as protests and collective social media campaigns.

  • The FMD outbreak will very likely highlight weaknesses in Hungary’s emergency management response system, likely exacerbated by systemic issues, such as corruption, lack of transparency, and the politicization of the crisis by the government. Operational deficiencies will very likely undermine the effectiveness of response efforts, likely decreasing public confidence in the government’s ability to manage similar crises. The culling of livestock will likely affect the local economy of affected areas and communities, with a roughly even chance of increasing grievances among Hungarian rural society. Politicized crisis framing and weak inter-agency coordination will very likely limit Hungary’s ability to apply an effective, science-driven response to future agricultural outbreaks, likely increasing the risk of broad supply chain disruptions and reduced compliance with EU biosecurity standards.


Date: Zamzam, North Darfur Region, Sudan

Location: April 14, 2025

Parties involved: Sudan; Sudanese government; Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF); Sudanese paramilitary force Rapid Support Forces (RSF); rebel group Sudan Liberation Army (SLA); SLA spokesperson El-Sadiq Ali El-Nour; opposition group in Sudan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM); Sudanese armed civilian groups; Sudanese civilians; Mellit town civilians; Kebkabiya town civilians; Zamzam Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); medical humanitarian aid organization, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) aka Doctors Without Borders; independent non-governmental organization (NGO) ensuring humanitarian protection and assistance, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); international organization within the UN providing food assistance, World Food Programme (WFP)

The event: RSF claims control of the Zamzam camp, displacing up to 400,000 refugees and dismantling critical infrastructures.[3]

Analysis & Implications:

  • RSF seizing control of the Zamzam camp will likely increase military confrontation in the area between RSF and the armed civilian groups aligned with SLA and JEM, as these groups will very likely deploy forces to defend the local communities. Armed civilian groups will likely recruit and militarize civilians to fight RSF, defend their families, and deter looting and violence, likely relying on SLA and JEM for military and logistical support. The rise in armed civilian groups will likely lead to the fragmentation of the population, as local commanders will likely possess unchecked power, likely undermining the government’s legitimacy and power, and reducing the possibility for centralized governance in Sudan.

  • The renewed attack and the likely armed confrontation between RSF and SAF will very likely force humanitarian organizations such as MSF, ICRC, and WFP to withdraw from the Zamzam camp, very likely prompting the establishment of aid camps in areas surrounding El Fasher. This will likely lead to IDPs’ migration toward other regions in North Darfur and central and eastern Sudan, including towns such as Mellit and Kebkabiya, increasing the risk of attacks from RSF and SAF, as civilians resettle. The opposing armed parties will likely battle for control of strategic towns like Tawila to expand their political and military influence. New military gains from either side will very likely reduce humanitarian access to the newly conquered towns, likely creating a chain reaction that hinders civilian access to medical facilities, food, and water.

  • RSF will very likely use the Zamzam camp as a strategic location to increase offensive operations against El Fasher via the B26 highway, likely impeding SAF’s ability to hold the city. The Zamzam camp will very likely enable RSF to set up checkpoints to prevent the flow of weapons, ammunition, and essential food and water from getting to the SAF’s 6th Infantry Division located in El Fasher, likely weakening SAF’s defensive capabilities in Darfur. RSF will likely use the camp as a new military base and weapons depot, likely stationing ground troops coming from other regions of Sudan, such as Khartoum, to increase military personnel outside of El Fasher. RSF will also likely use the Zamzam camp as a launch point in an urban assault, likely allowing for a multi-front attack on El Fasher through the north, the south, and the east while also using aerial bombardment to support the advancement of ground troops.


Date: April 15, 2025

Location: Moscow, Russia

Parties involved: Russia; Russian court; Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny; Russian state media; Russian opposition-affiliated journalists; Russian citizens; Georgia; foreign media; social media platforms; foreign service providers

The event: A Russian court convicted four journalists on extremism charges stemming from alleged ties with opposition leader Alexei Navalny.[4]

Analysis & Implications:

  • Russia’s criminalization of opposition journalism very likely indicates a shift away from extremism laws used as general deterrents. Opposition discourse criminalization will likely increase uncertainty among domestic and foreign-affiliated journalists about the retroactive and current risk of their reporting. The uncertainty will very likely discourage journalists from covering politically sensitive topics, including those not officially banned but still seen as politically sensitive. In the long term, free speech will very likely diminish within Russia, likely reducing public exposure to independent narratives about the state and creating a void of unbiased reporting.

  • Russia will almost certainly prohibit citizens’ access to foreign media and social media platforms, very likely justifying it as a preventive measure to counter extremism and disinformation. The Kremlin will very likely fully suppress proxy services, such as VPNs, anonymizers, and access to foreign hosting providers and cloud services, likely reinforcing a state-controlled information environment. State media narratives on journalists' convictions will very likely justify restrictions on foreign media, almost certainly constraining avenues for international scrutiny of Russia’s adherence to human rights obligations through limited access to Russian law practices. Limited foreign oversight will very likely allow the Kremlin to increase regime insulation, almost certainly challenging Western condemnation of these practices and fueling repression through Russia’s opaque legal practices.


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[1] Hungarian Cattle Farm, generated by a third party image database (created by AI)

[2] Hungary suggests 'biological attack' could be source of foot-and-mouth outbreak, Reuters, April 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hungary-investigating-outbreak-foot-and-mouth-disease-orbans-chief-staff-says-2025-04-10/

[3] Sudan's RSF claims control of major Darfur camp, civilians flee, Reuters, April 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-rsf-claims-control-major-darfur-camp-civilians-flee-2025-04-13/ 

[4] Russia jails former DW journalists over Navalny ties, DW, April 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/russia-jails-former-dw-journalists-over-navalny-ties/a-72182640

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